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ABSTRACT
EFFECTS OF SIMULATANEOUS ALARMS ON RESOLUTION HEURISTICS
Amanda C. Allen 
Old Dominion University, 2014 
Director: Dr. J. Christopher Brill, Ph.D.
Automated signaling systems are frequently used to direct operator attention to 
potential hazards. Although these automated systems can lead to enhanced human 
performance, factors such as degraded alarm signal reliability and lack of trust can 
undermine the potential benefits of automation (Breznitz, 1984; Rice, 2009, Wickens & 
2007). Additionally, work by Gilson, Mouloua, Graft, and McDonald (2001), as well as 
Keller and Rice (2009), suggest that an alarm contained within a larger array of alarms 
should not be evaluated individually. Due to the increasing use of multiple alarms in 
complex environments such as operating rooms and cockpits (Konkani, Oakley, & Bauld, 
2012; Woods, Sarter, & Billings, 1997), it is important to identify reaction strategies that 
may and should be used when an unreliable alarm is in the presence of other alarms. 
Accordingly, the influence of reliability level and the number of additional activated 
alarms on objective trust, reaction time, and acceptance rate with a 12-alarm array was 
evaluated using a 2 x 12 split-plot factorial design. Overall a significant linear trend was 
observed in objective trust measures as the number of additional activated alarms ip < 
.001). This finding indicates the number of additional activated alarms, instead of the 
given alarm reliability, was used to calibrate objective trust. Reaction time was found to 
be quadratic (p < .001). Acceptance rate followed a cubic trend (p < .001), with 
significant quadratic ip = .02) and significant linear ip < .001) derivative trends. This 
suggests participant response changed from alarm dismissal to acceptance near 50% of
alarm array activation. Finally, there was a significant effect of reliability level (p < .001) 
on acceptance rate, although no significance differences were found between the 50% 
and 75% groups. Overall, the results constitute evidence for an extension of probability 
matching theory based on percent system activation and indicate the need to minimize 
alarms in display design.
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Human beings use automated alarms every day. In the workforce, an automated 
alarm can signal critical events: warning aircraft pilots to change altitude, aiding doctors 
as they operate, and helping engineers monitor power plant functions. Often alarm 
systems enhance human performance; however, factors such as degraded alarm signal, 
reliability, and trust, can alter how the operator uses automated signaling systems 
(Breznitz, 1984; Getty, Swets, Pickett, & Gontheir, 1995; Wiegmann, Rich, and Zhang, 
2001). Due to the potential consequences of alarm misuse and disuse (Parasuraman & 
Riley, 1997), a large portion of the alarm literature is dedicated to exploring which 
factors influence human interaction with individual alarms. Yet, relatively few articles 
explore how human behavior changes in the presence of multiple simultaneous alarms. 
Given the increasing use of multiple alarms in environments such as operating rooms and 
cockpits (Konkani, Oakley, & Bauld, 2012; Woods, Sarter, & Billings, 1997), it is 
important to identify strategies that may be used when responding to multiple automated 
alarms. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to explore alarm response strategies to 
an unreliable alarm when multiple simultaneous alarms are present.
Alarms
Often the terms alarm, alert, and warning are used interchangeably. However, it 
is important to distinguish between the three types of signals as they may elicit differing 
responses. To address the ambiguity of these terms, Bliss and Gilson (1998) defined 
alarms, alerts, and warnings as part of a taxonomy for emergency signals.
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Alarms are signals that require an immediate response from the human operator 
(Bliss & Gilson, 1998). A common example is a fire alarm. The alarm signals the 
presence of danger (the fire) and an immediate reaction (evacuation) is required to avoid 
this danger. Alerts signal that a dangerous condition will develop if  current conditions 
continue (Bliss & Gilson, 1998). As such, alerts may not require an immediate response. 
For example, the gas light indicator signals a condition (low fuel) that will eventually 
result in danger to the operator (the car shutting off). However, this danger is not 
currently present, thus, the response does not need to be immediate. Warnings are 
typically written, and indicate that danger may exist given certain conditions (Bliss & 
Gilson, 1998). A spray paint can contains a warning that the contents are under pressure, 
and that should external temperatures exceed a specified threshold, combustion may 
occur.
One of the defining characteristics used to distinguish alarms, alerts, and 
warnings, is the response required by the operator. Alarms require an immediate 
response, alerts require an eventual response, and warnings indicate when a response 
should take place. Additionally, alarms and alerts can be delivered through any modality 
and are most frequently found as part of an automated system.
Automation
Automated systems complete, or partially complete, a task that could be 
performed by a human operator (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Typically, automation is 
implemented when a task is too dangerous, difficult, unpleasant, or impossible for a 
human operator to perform (Wickens, Lee, Liu, & Becker, 2004). For example, the 
mining industry has begun to use automated mining machines due to the danger mining
presents for human laborers (Lynas & Horberry, 2011). In the power generation industry, 
trend displays are implemented for use in process control to show the current state of the 
plant, as well as anticipated states. Monitoring and predicting power plant states may be 
too mentally demanding for the operator, given the many other tasks they must complete 
(Moray, 1997). Both of these instances exemplify different levels o f  automation as well 
as categories of automation.
Levels of automation (LOA) are defined by the degree of human involvement, or 
the level of control, the human operator has over a course of action (Endsley & Kaber, 
1999). In contrast, categories refer to the type, rather than level, of automation. Using a 
simplified version of the information processing model (Figure 1), Parasuraman,
Sheridan, and Wickens (2000) proposed four categories of automation: (1) information 










Figure I. Simplified Model of Human Information Processing System. Adapted from “A 
Model for Types and Levels o f Human Interaction with Automation” by R. Parasuraman, 
T. B. Sheridan, and C. D. Wickens, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and 
Cybernetics - Part A: Systems and Humans, 30 (3), p. 287. Copyright 2000 by IEEE.
Stage 1 of the information-processing model, sensory processing, refers to the 
sensation and perception of external stimuli by a human being. When applied to 
automation, this stage corresponds with the first category of automation: information
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acquisition, wherein the collection and aggregation of data obtained through sensors is 
automated.
It is important to note that the level of automation can vary in each category of 
automation, and different levels of automation can produce differing effects on human 
performance (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). For example, in the 
information acquisition category, sensors that automatically adjust their positions to 
optimize data acquisition would characterize low levels of automation. The human 
operator must manually sort and prioritize the data. The highlighting of important data 
by the automation would represent a higher LOA. An even higher LOA would consist of 
filtering information, in which the automation reviews the data and displays only certain 
information to the operator, resulting in less human involvement. As a result, it is 
essential to specify the level and category of automation under investigation to ensure 
proper generalization of results. This is especially important for theoretical predictions, 
as the predicted outcomes may apply to only certain types or levels of automation. For 
the purposes of this study, multiple alarm signal response will be examined by using a 
sensor-based signaling system, which represents low levels of automation within the first 
(information acquisition) category of automation.
Sensor-Based Signaling Systems
The term “sensor-based signaling systems” (henceforth called signaling systems) 
was created to describe automated systems used to monitor sources of potential hazards 
and to direct user attention as needed (Bliss & Gilson, 1998). From a theoretical 
standpoint, signaling systems correspond to the first stage of information processing, 
sensory processing, due to the automation’s purpose of gathering external data. This
purpose is similar to how a human would sense and process external stimuli. Using the 
corresponding categories proposed by Parasuraman et al. (2000), signaling systems are 
thus categorized as information acquisition automation.
A common example of a signaling system is a smoke detector. Once a threshold 
of smoke concentration has been reached, the system will direct human attention to the 
potential threat of fire. Although this example demonstrates the use of a signaling system 
for an alarm, these systems can also be implemented to issue alerts or warnings (as 
previously defined), thus providing a broad range of applications (Bliss & Gilson, 1998; 
Meyer 2004). Given this range of functions, signaling systems are perhaps one of the 
most familiar forms of automation; signaling systems can be found in security 
monitoring, aviation, medicine, transportation, power generation, and military application 
domains (Wickens, 2004).
Trust
Due to the prevalence of signaling systems, it is vital to understand the factors 
affecting human-automation interaction. If the human operator does not respond 
appropriately to a signaling system, then the value of the automation is diminished. In 
critical situations, an inappropriate response can even result in death. For example, a 
smoke detector may signal the possible presence of fire, yet people may ignore the signal 
and fail to evacuate.
Because of the potential consequences associated with ignoring a sensor-based 
signal, considerable research has been devoted to identifying key factors that influence an 
operator’s decision to dismiss or ignore critical signals. One of the most prevalent factors 
thought to influence human-automation interaction is trust. Simply, if  the operator does
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not trust an automated system, such as a smoke detector, he or she is less likely to use 
that system. This relationship between trust and automation use has been the subject of 
considerable research (Lee & Moray, 1994; Muir & Moray, 1996; Lee & See, 2004;
Muir, 1986,1994; Rice, 2009, Wiegmann et al., 2001).
Subjective measures of trust. In exploring the construct of trust, Muir (1987) 
suggested that trust in automation is similar to interpersonal trust. Under this theory, trust 
in automation can be affected by the same factors that affect trust in humans. For 
example, Rempel, Holmes, and Zanna (1985) identified three dimensions o f interpersonal 
trust: predictability, dependability, and faith. These dimensions are comparable to 
human-automation dimensions of trust suggested by Sheridan (1981): reliability, 
dependence, familiarity, and robustness.
Similarly, Mooreman, Deshpande, and Zaltman (1993) defined interpersonal trust 
as a “willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one has confidence” (p. 82), 
indicating reliance and confidence as key components of interpersonal trust. Wiegmann, 
et al. (2001) built upon this and defined subjective measures of automation trust as users’ 
confidence ratings and verbal estimates of reliability. Although the nature of trust is still 
debated in the literature, many constructs of trust include dimensions of reliability, 
confidence, and/or dependability (Jian, Bisantz, & Drury, 2000; Rempel et ah, 1985; 
Sheridan, 1981; Wiegmann et ah, 2001). However, popular measures of subjective trust, 
such as the one by Jian et ah (2001), have yet to be validated. Thus the use of subjective 
measures of trust can be controversial.
Objective measures of trust. Trust has also been measured using objective 
(behavioral) measures. Muir and Murray (1996) found a positive correlation between
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trust and the amount of control allocated to the system by operators using a virtual 
pasteurizer plant. Similarly, trust has been found to be a factor in reliance on augmented 
vision system in target identification (Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, Dawe, & Anderson,
2001). Field studies have also identified the role of trust through observations of 
autopilot use and flight management systems (Moiser, Skitka, & Kore, 1994).
There is some evidence that reaction time may be a particularly useful indicator of 
trust. A qualitative study by Getty, Swets, Pickett, and Gonthier (1995), found 
participants reacted more quickly to alarms with high Positive Predictive Values than 
alarms with low Positive Predictive Values. Subsequently, some authors choose to 
measure trust using reaction time (Rice, 2009). Rice wrote, “I assumed that when 
participants trusted the automation, they would quickly agree with the aid” (p. 312). 
Although Rice (2009) does not cite the reasons for his assumptions, they may be based on 
the earlier work by Getty, Swets, Pickett, and Gonthier.
Conversely, there is also evidence that trust does not mediate the relationship 
between reliability and reaction time. Chancey (2013) empirically assessed how 
subjective measures of trust mediate response behavior. It was found that trust partially 
mediated the relationship between reliability rate and agreement rate, however, trust did 
not mediate the relationship between reliability and reaction time. These findings were 
supported by a subsequent study in which the role of trust as a mediator for reliability and 
reaction time was analyzed (Chancey, Proaps, Bliss, 2013). Additionally, Wiegmann 
(2001) did not find consistent correlations between subjective measures of trust and 
reaction time, suggesting that reaction time may not be a good indication of trust.
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It is possible that the decreased reaction times observed in Rice’s work are due to 
participants' confidence in their own responses, and not the participants’ trust in the alarm 
itself. It is conceivable that more highly reliable automation would induce higher levels 
of response confidence in participants, and thus reaction time may be a function of 
response confidence and not an indication of trust in the alarm. As a result of the 
seemingly conflicting evidence, the relationship between trust and objective measures is 
also controversial in the literature.
In an effort to more fully understand the role of trust in multiple alarm situations, 
both subjective and objectives measures of trust are used in this study.
Reliability
Because no automation can ever be 100% reliable, unreliability is an inherent 
problem with all automation. In keeping with the smoke detector example, the smoke 
detector’s sensor collects data about particles in the air. These data are processed using 
an algorithm to determine if the preset threshold has been met, at which point the smoke 
detector will signal the presence of smoke. However, if the threshold is too liberal, it will 
signal the presence of smoke when relatively few particles are in the air, which might be 
indicative of dust accumulation or a slight wisp of smoke from extinguishing a candle. 
This could constitute a false alarm, depending on the consequences associated with the 
presence of smoke. Conversely, if  the threshold is set too conservatively, the smoke 
detector may fail to signal the human operator, despite the presence of smoke. This 
constitutes a miss.
Both false alarms and misses have been studied extensively in the literature. 
Evidence suggests false-alarm and miss-prone systems may evoke differing responses
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from the human operator (Parasurman & Riley, 1997). In false-alarm prone systems, the 
operator may not trust that the alarm is a true alarm due to the high occurrence of false 
alarms. Consequently, operators react more slowly (Getty et al., 1995), ignore, or disable 
the alarm (Sorkin, 1988). This response behavior has been termed the “cry-wolf ’ effect, 
based on Breznitz’s (1984) work examining behavioral and physiological responses to 
false alarms. Similarly, specific patterns of behavior have been associated with miss- 
prone alarms. In miss-prone systems, operators may develop a maladaptive automation 
reliance behavior called misuse, in which the operator fails to detect a miss due to an 
over-reliance on the system to detect all hazards (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). The 
operator trusts the automation to accurately detect and identify all hazards.
Because the unreliability of the signaling system affects operator trust (Lee &
See, 2004; Meyer, 2001; Rice, 2009), it is important to consider alarm reliability when 
investigating operator trust and response behaviors. In a study by Wiegmann et al.
(2001), higher reliability levels resulted in higher agreement rates, quicker decision times 
with affirmative decisions, higher confidence ratings, and higher subjective ratings of 
automation reliability. It was also found that operators were sensitive to changes in 
reliability (Wiegmann et al., 2001).
In some cases, lower reliability levels of automation can be so detrimental to 
performance it would be better if  there were no automation at all (Wickens & Dixon, 
2007). The level at which performance falls below baseline (performance levels with no 
automation) is estimated to be at 70% reliability (Wickens & Dixon, 2007). This 
estimate was determined using regression analysis of the results of over 40 studies.
These studies included Type 1 (Information Acquisition) and Type 2 (Information
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Analysis) automation, miss-prone and false alarm-prone systems, as well as a variety of 
opaque and clear systems. It should also be noted that reliability had a more pronounced 
effect on performance when workload was high, such as a dual task paradigm. Given the 
variety of conditions represented in the data set used, 70% can only be used as a general 
estimate, and a range of reliabilities should be used when possible.
Multiple Alarms
The preponderance of literature is dedicated to investigating single automated 
sensor-based signals. However, relatively little research has identified strategies for 
responding to multiple contiguous sensor-based signals. This is a critical omission in the 
literature because technology has afforded the development of increasingly complex 
systems, which can often have more than one potential hazard, suggesting the need for 
multiple sensor-based signals. To illustrate, airplane cockpits and nuclear power plants 
can have potentially hundreds of alarm signals. The likelihood of needing to resolve 
multiple signals co-located in the same environment can be high. In an extreme case, 
during the Three Mile Island nuclear power incident, more than 500 annunciators 
changed status (Sheridan, 1981). Moreover, confusion over the relationship between 
ambiguous indicators can pose a problem to operators who may be forced to make a 
decision (Gilson, Mouloua, Graft, & McDonald, 2001).
Several strategies for single alarm response have been previously observed in the 
literature. For example, Bliss, Gilson, and Deaton (1995) found evidence of probability 
matching behavior, as well as what the authors termed an “optimal strategy” response 
pattern. Approximately 10% of the participants adopted the “optimal strategy” and 
became “extreme responders” such that in accepting a 75% reliable alarm at every
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presentation, participants ensured that they were correct 75% of the time (1.00 * .75=
.75). In contrast, the majority of participants used a probability matching strategy, which 
results in lower overall accuracy.
Probability matching is a strategy in which in alarm acceptance is calibrated based 
on alarm reliability. Statistically, if a participant accepts a 75% reliable alarm in only 
75% of presentations, then the resulting correct alarm acceptance rate would be 56.25% 
(0.75 x 0.75= 56.25). Given that various alarm response strategies have been identified 
with single alarms, it is likely that an operator may also use one or more strategies when 
responding to multiple alarms.
Two strategies proposed by Keller and Rice (2009) are component-specific trust 
and system-wide trust. In component-specific trust, an unreliable signal is viewed as an 
individual component that is separate from the other sensor-based signals that may also 
be present. Consequently, acceptance rates of the other, more reliable, alarm signals in 
an array should be unaffected by a single unreliable alarm signal. Alternatively, the 
operator may adopt system-wide trust, in which the reliability of an alarm signal is 
evaluated based on the entire system of sensor-based signals. Keller and Rice evaluated 
these two theories through a series of studies.
In an initial study, Keller and Rice (2009) presented participants with two gauges, 
the second of which was always 100% reliable. The other gauge was 70%, 85%, or 100% 
reliable, depending on group assignment. Sensitivity of the second (100% reliable) alarm 
decreased in conditions where the first alarm was 70% or 85% reliable. Thus, the 
imperfect alarm impacted sensitivity for the always 100% reliable alarm. This “dragging 
down” effect was later observed with alarm agreement rates using a larger eight-alarm
12
array (Geels-Blair, Rice, & Schwark, 2013). Agreement rates for the always 100% 
reliable alarms (alarms 2-8) lowered in conditions where the first alarm was imperfect. 
The effect on seemingly unrelated signals, in a variety o f signal array sizes, suggests 
operators adopted system-wide trust as opposed to component-wide trust.
It should be noted that all measures of trust in these two studies were objective: 
reaction time and alarm acceptance. Some researchers, such as Wiegmann et al. (2001), 
recommend that subjective measures should be used to indicate trust (a psychological 
construct), and objective behavioral measures should to indicate automation reliance.
This recommendation is based on findings that objective and subjective measures of trust 
were inconsistently correlated (Wiegmann et al., 2001).
Additionally the signals used by Rice et al. were not completely opaque, the 
operator could verify the accuracy of the alarm by comparing the gauge value to a given 
safe value; however, it required significant cognitive resources to verify alarm accuracy 
due to their complexity. There are also issues concerning when the alarms were active.
In the 2009 experiment by Keller and Rice, only a single alarm was activated at any 
given time. As previously mentioned, it is possible, and in some environments likely, 
that multiple signals will simultaneously indicate a hazard. Although it was feasible for 
more than one alarm to be activated in each trial of the 2013 study (Geels-Blair, Rice, & 
Schwark, 2013), the results were not analyzed based on the number of activated alarms 
present. The work by Gilson, Mouloua, Graft and MacDonald (2001) addresses some of 
these issues by examining confidence when multiple-alarm signals are present.
In a series of studies by Gilson et al., participants were given an array of six 
alarms, one of which was marked “test” alarm. Participants were told that the test alarm
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was only 50% reliable, meaning that it was actually a false alarm half of the time the 
alarm was activated. A series of trials were then presented in which additional alarms 
were activated with the test alarm. When only the test alarm was activated, participant’s 
average confidence that the test alarm was a true alarm was 23%, significantly lower than 
the given 50% reliability level. As the number of additional active alarms increased, so 
did participant confidence. An activation of all six alarms produced an average 
confidence rating of 97%. Additionally, the increase of confidence level with additional 
alarm activation produced a significant linear trend. Gilson et al. (2001) subsequently 
postulated that confidence level is founded upon the overall number of activated alarms. 
These changes in confidence level suggest that participants evaluate spatially contiguous 
alarms as part of a larger system and not independently, similar to the findings of Geels- 
Blair, Rice, and Schwark (2013).
Gilson et al.’s (2001) research raises many intriguing questions; however there are 
several things to note concerning his work. First is the issue of reliability. As previously 
mentioned, the work by Wickens and Dixon (2007) recommends that a variety of 
reliability levels should be used, with 70% as the possible threshold for automation 
related performance increases. A 50% reliability level is akin to guessing and may not be 
the most ecologically valid reliability level. Additionally, the context of the alarm signal 
was not given to the participant. Although such situations may exist in the real world, for 
example someone may hear a smoke alarm while in a different room from the fire, the 
lack of alarm context in this experiment raises the question of ecological validity.
Furthermore, Gilson et al. (2001) used six-alarm arrays in their studies. If 
participants are indeed basing confidence on the percentage of the overall all system
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activation, this would necessitate only six possible percentage estimates. Four of these 
six possible activation estimates would occur when the number of activated alarms, 
divided by the total number of alarms, results in commonly used fractions such as 1/3,
1/2, 2/3, and 1/1. If a larger array had been used, a greater number of percentage 
estimations formed from uncommon and more difficult to evaluate fractions would be 
required. Research suggests that people tend to underestimate high probabilities and 
under estimate low probabilities (Hollands & Dryer, 2000). It is possible that the 
increased complexity of a larger array may reveal a non-linear pattern of estimation, 
similar to that of previous research on proportion estimation. If Gilson’s idea of system 
percent-activation is correct, then an array with one out of six alarms activated should 
produce the same percent confidence rating as an array with two out of 12 alarms 
activated.
Most importantly, although confidence has been identified as a critical component 
of automation-human interaction (Jian, Bisantz, & Drury, 2000; Rempel et a l l  985; 
Sheridan, 1981; Wiegmann et al., 2001), confidence estimates alone do not fully capture 
the construct of trust. A more robust measure of trust and its different dimensions, to 
include the dimension of confidence, would allow for a more accurate interpretation of 
the results.
Goal of Present Study
The purpose of the present study was to evaluate the system-percentage strategy 
proposed by Gilson et al. (2001) using a larger, 12-alarm array with three levels of 
reliability. Additionally, participants were required to accept or dismiss the alarm and 
answer a trust questionnaire, in order to obtain both subjective and objective measures of
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trust. The alarms were opaque and false alarm prone; however, a context was given to 
participants to provide ecological validity.
Based on the previous literature discussed, there are four hypotheses. First, a 
greater number of activated alarms will lead to higher acceptance rates on an unreliable 
test alarm than when fewer alarms are activated. This hypothesis is based on the work by 
Keller and Rice (2009), and Geels-Blair, Rice, and Schwark (2013), where it was found 
reliability of surrounding alarms (as perceived by the number of alarm activations over 
time) were a factor in alarm acceptance by the participant. Given the previous influence 
of surrounding alarms, it is anticipated that participants in this study will likewise use the 
activation of surrounding alarms when responding to the test alarm, resulting in a higher 
acceptance rate when a greater percentage of the display is activated.
Second, subjective trust of the unreliable test alarm will increase as the number 
of additional activated alarms increases. Gilson et al., (2001) found confidence, a 
dimension of subjective trust, increased as the number of additional activated alarms 
increased. Consequently, it is expected that subjective measures of trust will also 
increase as the number of additional alarms increases.
Third, reaction time is hypothesized to follow a quadratic trend: as the number of 
activated alarms reaches the extremes (all or none of the array), participants will respond 
more quickly to the unreliable test alarm. When studying multiple alarms, Gilson et. al 
(2001) measured participants’ confidence in the test alarm. Gilson found when all of the 
alarm array was activated, participants were confident the alarm was true. When no 
additional alarms were activated, participants expressed low confidence that the alarm 
was true, suggesting that the participants were confident that it was a false alarm. As
previously discussed, it is possible that the decreased reaction times observed in previous 
work (Keller & Rice, 2009; Geels-Blair, Rice, and Schwark 2013; Rice, 2009) may be 
due to participants' confidence in their own responses, and not the participants’ trust in 
the alarm itself. If reaction time is a function of response confidence, it can be 
hypothesized that participants will have faster reaction times at higher confidence levels. 
Thus, based on this previously found confidence pattern (Gilson et al., 2001), it is 
predicted there will be higher confidence in a response (accept or dismiss) at the extremes 
of multiple alarm activation (all and none), producing an overall quadratic trend in 
reaction time.
Finally, it is hypothesized that there will be an anchoring effect: participants 
exposed to highly reliable alarms will indicate significantly higher mean trust ratings 
compared to participants exposed to less reliable alarms. Many researchers have 
discussed the role of reliability, however Wiegmann, et al., (2001) explicitly examined 
how different levels of reliability effect both subjective and objective trust, finding 
participants to be sensitive to differing levels of reliability. Accordingly, it is predicted 
that participants in this study will exhibit higher levels of subjective trust at the 100% 
reliability level than the 75% and 50% level, respectively. Similarly, there will be higher 





This experiment employed a 2 x 12 mixed factorial experimental design. The 
between-groups independent variable, alarm reliability, consisted of three levels: 50%, 
75%, and 100% true alarms. The within-groups independent variable was the number of 
additional activated alarms. Dependent variables were reaction time, subjective trust, and 
alarm acceptance rate.
Participants
A power analysis conducted using G*Power 3.1 software estimated a sample size 
of 42 participants for this study. Due to the lack of established effect sizes with multiple 
alarms, a conservative small to medium effect size was used to establish the target sample 
size for the primary ANOVA analysis (. 15, a = .05 and p = .80). Based on this power 
analysis, 44 participants (19 males and 25 females) were recruited from the Old 
Dominion University Psychology Department subject pool and compensated with 
research participation credit. The mean age of participants was 20 years (SD = 4.2, min = 
18, max = 45). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and did not 
report any sensorimotor deficits. On average, participants reported playing video games 
3.0 hours per week (SD = 2.7, min = 0, max = 7).
This study was approved by Old Dominion University Institutional Review Board 




All experimental equipment and programs were controlled by a desktop computer 
with an Intel Core i7 2.67 GHz processor and 9.00 GB system RAM. Visual stimuli were 
presented on a standard 22-inch LG LCD color computer monitor using SuperLab 4.5.2 
software. The computer monitor was approximately 12 cm above the surface of the desk 
and 60 cm from the seated participant.
Stimuli. Participants were presented with a 12-alarm array, as illustrated in Figure
2 .
Test
Figure 2. Sample 12-Alarm Array with Three Activated Alarms.
The alarm stimulus consisted of four rows of three boxes, creating a 12-box array. 
The boxes were 6 cm x 3 cm with a 1 cm space separating all boxes. Based upon the 
placement of the monitor and typical viewing distance, each box subtended average
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viewing angles of 5.8 degrees horizontally and 2.9 degrees vertically. Each box 
represented an alarm, and activated alarms were displayed in gray. Prior research has 
found the perception of red enhances motor function response as compared to lightness- 
matched gray alarms (Elliot & Aarts, 2011). Although red is often used in alarm signals, 
grey was chosen for the stimuli in this experiment so as not to preclude color deficient or 
color blind students. The upper left alarm was labeled "test" in all presentations of the 
stimulus, to indicate the unreliable alarm the participant would be responding to during 
the experiment.
Response Method. A Cedrus model RB-530 response box was used to record 
responses. The response box contains a subprocessor for low latency and is accurate to 
within one millisecond. The RB-530 buttons are approximately 2.0 x 2.4 cm in size and 
located 1.0 cm apart. “Accept” and “Dismiss” labels were affixed to the left and right 
response button, respectively. A standard keyboard number pad was used to record 
participant responses to a trust questionnaire.
Tasks and Measures
Primary Task: Multi-Attribute Task Battery (MATBII). The MATB II 
program simulates the kinds of tasks that pilots perform during flight (Santiago-Espada, 
Meyer, Latorella, & Comstock, 2011). Participants were asked to perform the 
compensatory tracking task available in this battery (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Compensatory Tracking Task.
Using a joystick, participants were asked to keep a blue reticle as close to the 
center of the pair of crosshairs as possible. This center location is further identified by a 
square surrounding the area. During the task, the reticle continuously drifts in random 
directions. Participants must make compensatory movements to keep the reticle centered 
on the crosshairs. The purpose of the task is to simulate maintaining level flight while 
environmental factors, such as wind, affect the aircraft. The root mean square error of the 
reticle was recorded every 15 seconds. The root mean square error is considered an 
indication of the stability of tracking performance, as it describes the error of the 
participant in holding the reticle at center.
Secondary Task: 12-Alarm array configuration. Participants were presented 
with an array configuration consisting of 12 alarms. The top left alarm was designated 
and labeled the "test" alarm. Typically, a miss is generated when an alarm fails to signal 
when there is a real hazard. In this experiment, the test alarm was always activated, thus
2 1
the test alarm could only produce real or false alarms. On any given trial, from one and 
eleven additional alarms were also activated. Presentation of an alarm configuration 
occurred after a random inter-stimulus-interval of 8, 12, or 16 seconds to prevent 
participants from forming a response rhythm. The positions of the additional activated 
alarms were pre-selected at random. Participants were prompted to accept or dismiss the 
test alarm, using the Cedrus model RB-530 response box, as quickly and accurately as 
possible. Reaction time was measured in milliseconds from the presentation of the 
stimulus to response input (alarm acceptance or dismissal). Acceptance rates for each 
alarm configuration were calculated by dividing the number of alarm acceptance 
responses by the total number of presentations. No response feedback was given.
Trust Questionnaire. A modified version of Jian, Bisantz, and Drury’s (2000) 
human-automation trust questionnaire was used to assess participants’ trust in the test 
alarm. The original survey consists of five items assessing operator distrust, and six 
items assessing operator trust. As participants were presented with the trust questionnaire 
after every trial, the complete Jian, Bisantz, and Drury trust questionnaire would have 
been potentially fatiguing to participants. Thus, the modified version used in this study 
retained questions only from the trust portion of the questionnaire, which best aligned 
with previous research on dimensions of trust (Muir, 1987; Rempel et al., 1985; Sheridan, 
1998). Additionally, when examining the human-automation trust questionnaire, the trust 
items were compared to dimensions of trust previously identified, most notably by 
Sheridan (1988; familiarity, reliability, and confidence) and by Muir (1987; faith, 
predictability, and dependability). Two trust questionnaire items from the Jian, Bisantz, 
and Drury measure were unrelated to previously identified trust dimensions (i.e., this
2 2
system provides security and this system has integrity). These two questions were also 
removed. The resulting questionnaire consisted of four questions:
•  How confident are you the test alarm is a true alarm?
• How much do you trust the alarm?
• How reliable is the alarm?
• How dependable is the alarm?
Participants were instructed to respond honestly to all questions using a scale of 
0-100. As an example, participants were told a response of 100 to the question “how 
confident are you the test alarm is a true alarm?” indicates full confidence, and zero 
indicates no confidence. Responses were entered using a standard numeric keypad. The 
four questions were displayed in random order after each alarm configuration 
presentation. This randomization prevents survey bias based on question order. 
Additionally, each alarm configuration was randomly presented a total of five times 
throughout the experiment.
Separate dimension scores were calculated by averaging the responses to each of 
the four questions presented for each alarm configuration. A composite trust score was 
then computed by summing all of a configuration’s dimension scores. As there is no 
theoretical justification to weighing one trust dimension greater than another, the 
approach of using unweighted averages and summations was used. Composite trust 
scores could range from 0-400.
Procedure
Participants were given an overview of the experiment and written informed 
consent was obtained (see Appendix A). A brief medical questionnaire (see Appendix B)
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was used to screen for sensory or motor deficits. Any sensorimotor deficits would result 
in exclusion from the study. Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
different reliability groups (50%, 75%, and 100%) and seated in front of a standard 
desktop computer.
A vignette was given to participants instructing them to pretend they were an 
airplane pilot. Participants were told they were in charge of flying the plane, their 
primary task, as well as responding to a panel of alarms, their secondary task. An 
example panel of a random 12-alarm array configuration was then displayed on the right­
most screen. Participants were informed each gray box represented an activated alarm 
indicating something was wrong with the plane. Depending on group assignment, 
participants were told the test alarm in each configuration was true 50%, 75%, or 100% 
of the time. As the pilot, participants were told they were responsible for either accepting 
the test alarm as a true alarm or dismissing the alarm as a false alarm. The “accept” and 
“dismiss” alarm response buttons were then pointed out to the participant. Participants 
were asked to respond as quickly and accurately as possible, and were reminded of the 
real-world consequences associated with alarm acceptance and dismissal: accepting an 
alarm as true would alert flight control and possibly delay or ground the flight, something 
the pilot should avoid if the alarm is not true. Alternatively, the safety of the passengers 
is also the responsibility of the pilot, and ignoring a true alarm may endanger the 
passengers onboard. No information was given concerning the reliability or relatedness 
of the other alarms in the panel. Once the alarm was accepted or dismissed participants 
were prompted to respond to the trust questionnaire. The numeric keypad was then 
demonstrated for questionnaire response.
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Following the secondary alarm task demonstration, the MATB-II tracking task 
was introduced to participants of the left-most screen. After familiarizing themselves 
with the tracking task for approximately 2 minutes, participants practiced both the 
primary and secondary task together for three randomly chosen alarm configurations of 
the secondary task. Completing both tasks on separate screens required a division of 
attention by the participants.
Once the practice session was completed, participants were given the opportunity 
to ask any questions before the start of the experiment. Participants were presented with 
five instances of each 12-alarm array configurations, in random order, resulting in 60 
trials. At the conclusion of the experiment, the participants were debriefed and 




All statistical tests were conducted using PASW Statistics 20 software, with a  = 
.05. No family-wise alpha corrections were made as hypotheses were a prio ri.
It should be noted that an alpha of level represents the probability of a Type I 
error, or detecting a relationship between variables when there is not one. Conversely, a 
Type II error represents the probability of failing to detect a relationship when there is 
one. A higher alpha level results in a higher probability of a Type I error, but a lower 
probability of a Type II error. The balance of a Type 1 and Type II, and the associated 
consequences of each, should be taken into account when choosing an alpha level for an 
experiment. However, what is considered an acceptable alpha level, and thus the best 
balance o f Type I and Type II errors, is conventionally set within a discipline (Maxwell 
& Delaney, 2004, p. 24), such as the a =.05 used in this study.
However, a conventionally set alpha level still does not fully address the concerns 
of a Type II error when examining a specific study within a discipline. Given this issue, 
Maxwell and Delaney (2004, p. 24) suggest that power, in addition to the set alpha level, 
should be taken into consideration when evaluating the validity of a statistical conclusion. 
Power is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is false. Statistically it is 
equivalent to 1 -  the probability of a Type II error. Higher power thus corresponds with a 
lower likelihood of a Type II error. All statistical tests performed in this experiment 
achieved an observed power level greater than .80.
To address the statistical assumption for normality, histograms of the data were 
visually inspected for unimodal distribution. Additionally, a skew and kurtosis threshold
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of |2| was used, as per the recommendations of Maxwell and Delaney (2004, p. 115). 
Levene’s Test was used to assess homogeneity of variance for the between-subject 
variable (reliability level). These assumptions of normality and homogeneity were 
generally met, and ANOVA is robust to violations of normality and moderate violations 
of homogeneity (Maxwell & Delaney, 2004, p. 110). For the within-subject variable 
(additional alarm activation), Mauchley’s tests were conducted to assess sphericity. The 
assumption of sphericity was violated and a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used in 
all cases. For a detailed report of descriptive analyses of the data, see Appendix C.
The 50% and 75% reliability level groups each contained 15 participants and the 
100% reliability level group contained 14 participants. However, reaction time data for 
one participant in the 50% reliability group was removed because the participant left the 
room during the experiment. Four participants in the 100% reliability group and one 
participant in the 50% reliability group adopted an optimization strategy wherein the 
participant accepted the alarm at every presentation. This behavior of extreme 
responding has been previously observed (Bliss, Gilson, & Deaton, 1995), and suggests 
that some operators may use alternative strategies. Nevertheless, these types of 
responders would also be present in real-world alarm scenarios, and their inclusion in this 
study increases ecological validity. Thus, these participants’ data were not adjusted or 
removed from the analyses. No additional outliers were removed from the data set for 
similar reasons of ecological validity.
Finally, polynomial trend analyses produce a-1 trend components, making an 11th 
order polynomial trend possible in this experiment. These higher order trends are often 
uninterruptable. Additionally, high numbers of polynomial trends increase the likelihood
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of a Type 1 error as well as present a danger of over fitting the data. However, data may 
represent combination of several pure polynomial trends, and thus it is recommended that 
higher order trends should be tested (Maxwell & Delaney, 2004, p. 259). As and 
example Maxwell and Delaney point out a negatively accelerated curve would increase as 
X increases, but the increases themselves become smaller over time (2004, p. 259). This 
example represents a model with both linear and quadratic components. It is thus 
important to report some higher order polynomial trends, as well as the pure polynomial 
trend that may best account for the data. For this experiment, a visual inspection of the 
graphed data and effect size are taken into account before reporting the highest 
interpretable significant polynomial trend in the text.
Hypothesis One: Acceptance Rate
The first hypothesis, that a greater number of activated alarms will result in 
significantly higher alarm acceptance rates of an unreliable alarm, was tested using a 2 x 
12 split-plot ANOVA. The between-groups independent variable was reliability level 
(50% and 75%), the within-groups independent variable was the number of additional 
activated alarms (0-11), and the dependent variable was acceptance rate. The 100% 
reliability was group not included in this analysis as it did not represent an unreliable 
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Figure 4. Acceptance Rate as a Function o f Number o f  Additional Activated Alarms.
There was no significant interaction between additional alarms and reliability 
level; however, a significant main effect of additional alarms was found, F(2.65, 74.06) = 
27.71, p  < .001, rjp2 = .50 (see Table 1). An a priori polynomial trend analysis of the 
main effect of the number of additional alarms revealed a significant cubic trend, F (l, 28) 
= 11.05, p  < .001, rip2 = .28, a significant quadratic trend, F(1,28) = 6.65, p  = .02, qp2 = 
.19, and a significant linear trend, F (l, 28) = 51.62,/? = <.001, qp2= .65. There was no 
significant difference between reliability groups.
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Table 1
Split-plot ANOVA for Effects o f Number o f Additional Alarms and Reliability Level on 
Acceptance Rate
Source SS d f MS F P %
Reliability Level 0.06 1.00 0.06 0.27 0.61 0.01
Error (between) 6.16 28.00 0.22
Additional
Alarms 24.62 2.65 9.31 27.71 <.001 0.50
Linear 22.06 1.00 22.06 51.62 <.001 0.65
Quadratic 0.75 1.00 0.75 6.65 0.02 0.19
Cubic 0.87 1.00 0.87 11.05 <.001 0.28
Additional
Alarms x
Reliability Level 0.99 2.65 0.38 1.12 0.34 0.04
Note. This table displays the omnibus sources of variance, as well as follow-up 
polynomial trend analyses of the main effect of the number of additional alarms.
Hypothesis Two: Subjective Trust. A 2 x 12 split-plot ANOVA was used to test the 
second hypothesis, that trust in and unreliable test alarm would increase as the number of 
additional activated alarms increases. Similar to the first hypothesis, the 100% reliability 
group was not included in this analysis, as it did not represent an unreliable alarm. The 
independent variables were alarm reliability (between-groups; 50% and 75%) and the 
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Figure 5. Composite Trust Score as a Function of Number of Additional Activated 
Alarms.
A significant main effect of additional alarms was found, F(1.73, 48.41) = 22.33, 
p  < .001, r|p = .44 (see Figure 5 and Table 2). An a priori polynomial trend analysis of 
the main effect of the number of additional alarms revealed a significant linear trend, F(1, 
28) = 29.68,/? = <.001, riP2 = .52. There was no significant difference in trust between 
the reliability levels. Additionally, there was no significant interaction between 
additional alarms and reliability level.
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Table 2
Split-plot ANOVA fo r Effects o f Number o f  Alarms and Reliability Level on Composite 
Trust Score
Source SS d f MS F P 2%
Reliability Level 16922.71 1.00 16922.71 2.74 0.11 0.09
Error (between) 173269.68 28.00 6188.20
Additional Alarms 835700.55 1.73 483339.02 22.33 <.001 0.44
Linear 817263.62 1.00 817263.62 29.68 <.001 0.52
Quadratic 3748.39 1.00 3748.39 2.05 0.16 0.07
Cubic 647.64 1.00 647.64 0.80 0.38 0.03
Additional Alarms x
Reliability Level 14540.71 1.73 8409.82 0.39 0.65 0.01
Note. This table displays the omnibus sources of variance, as well as follow-up 
polynomial trend analyses of the main effect of the number of additional alarms.
Hypothesis Three: Reaction Time
The third hypothesis, that reaction time will produce a quadratic trend, was 
evaluated using a 2 x 12 split-plot ANOVA. The 100% reliability group not included in 
this analysis as it did not represent an unreliable alarm. The independent variables were 
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Figure 6. Reaction Time as a Function of Number of Additional Activated Alarms.
There was no significant interaction between additional alarms and reliability 
level; however, a significant main effect of additional alarms was found, F(3.05, 82.39) = 
4.33, p  = .007, rjp2 = .14 (see Figure 6 and Table 3). An a priori polynomial trend 
analysis of the main effect of the number of additional alarms revealed a significant 
quadratic trend, F (l, 27) = 27.58, p  = <.001, r|p2 = .51. There was no significant 
difference between the reliability levels.
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Table 3
Split-plot ANO VA fo r Effects o f Number ofAdditional Alarms and Reliability Level on 
Reaction Time
Source SS d f MS F P CL
P*
Reliability Level 1666896.21 1.00 1666896.21 0.04 0.85 0.00
Error (between) 1292463031.39 27.00 47869001.16
Additional
Alarms 224003432.25 3.05 73406124.03 4.33 0.01 0.14
Linear 8330236.17 1.00 8330236.17 2.70 0.11 0.09
Quadratic 155343065.94 1.00 155343065.94 27.58 <.001 0.51
Cubic 5206592.92 1.00 5206592.92 0.85 0.36 0.03
Additional
Alarms x
Reliability Level 73294309.71 3.05 24018610.50 1.42 0.24 0.05
Note. This table displays the omnibus sources of variance, as well as follow-up 
polynomial trend analyses of the main effect of the number of additional alarms.
Hypothesis Four: Anchoring Effect
The fourth hypothesis, that an anchoring effect would be observed in participants' 
trust on the basis of alarm reliability, was evaluated using a 3 x 12 split-plot ANOVA 
with the 50%, 75%, and 100% reliability level. It was predicted that there would be 
significantly higher mean trust scores in the 75% reliability group than the 50% reliability 
group. Similarly, the 100% reliability group would exhibit significantly higher mean 












Figure 7. Mean Composite Trust Scores by Reliability Level.
There was a significant between groups difference in reliability level, F(2, 41) =
•y
14.60,/? < .001, r)p = .41. Planned pairwise comparisons revealed mean trust scores were 
significantly higher for the 100% reliability level (M = 314.1, SD = 14.3) than for the 
50% reliability level (M = 214.9, SD = 13.8), F (l, 41) = 25.1 Up  < .001, nP2 = .38. 
Similarly, the average 100% trust score (M= 314.1, SD = 14.3) was significantly higher 
than the average 75% trust score (M = 228.6, SD = 13.8), F( 1, 41) = 18.65,/? < .001, tip2 
= .31. However, no significant difference in trust was found between the 50% and 75% 
reliability groups (see Figure 7).






The goal of the present study was to assess the system percentage strategy 
identified by Gilson et al. (2001) using a larger 12-alarm array. In accordance with 
previous literature on reliability (Wickens & Dixon, 2007), two reliability levels were 
used when evaluating this strategy: 75%, and 50%. Dependent measures included 
reaction time, alarm acceptance rate, and scores from a multi-dimensional trust 
instrument. Overall, the hypotheses were supported. Subjective trust varied as a function 
of the overall number of additional activated alarms and was impacted by reliability level. 
Acceptance rate did follow a linear trend, as predicted; however, the highest order 
interpretable trend that was significant was cubic. Reaction time was quadratic in nature, 
as predicted. The implications of these results are discussed below.
Subjective versus Objective Measures of Trust
Much consideration was given to the use of subjective and objective measures of 
trust in this experiment. Getty et al., (1995) were among the first researchers to 
emphasize the use of reaction time to document trust as a function of reliability (which 
they termed Positive Predictive Value, “the probability that a warning will truly indicate 
some specified dangerous condition”; Getty et al., 1995, p. 30). Based on their study, 
they concluded faster reaction times are due to the higher Positive Predictive Value of an 
alarm. Although the definition of Positive Predictive Value can be interpreted as 
conditional reliability (i.e., the probability of an alarm signal given an event in the 
environment), the researchers also equated low Positive Predictive Value with the cry 
wolf effect, a phenomenon frequently associated with trust. Given this early research, it
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has been assumed by some alarm researchers (e.g., Rice, 2009) that an operator will 
respond more quickly to an alarm they trust and consequently more slowly to an alarm 
they do not trust.
Interestingly, Gilson et al. (2001) found that confidence, a dimension of trust, 
increased linearly as a function of the number of overall activated alarms. If participants 
do respond more quickly to an alarm they trust, then reaction time should, therefore, also 
follow a linear trend. However, in the present study reaction time formed a quadratic 
trend. This quadratic pattern differs from the linear trend observed in the subjective trust 
data, indicating that reaction time may not be the best measure of trust.
These findings support the work of Wiegmann et al. (2001), who did not found 
any correlations between reaction time and subjective measures of trust. In his work, 
Wiegmann (2001) shares a similar viewpoint of Lee and See (2004) by advocating trust 
as a psychological construct that should be assessed only with subjective measures.
Given the differing response patterns observed in the objective and subjective trust data 
of this study, the results of this experiment support this recommendation.
Although behavioral measures of trust represent less invasive alternatives to 
subjective measures, defining trust as a behavioral response should be approached with 
caution, as behavioral measures may reflect more than just participant trust. Moreover, 
the quadratic trend predicted in reaction time was based on inferences of response 
confidence, implying other factors may better explain the variance in response behaviors. 
It should be noted that response confidence is different from task self-confidence, which 
has be studied and found to impact automation trust (Lee and See, 2004). Task self 
confidence is the confidence the user has in his or her own ability to perform the
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automated task. For example, a nurse with high task self-confidence in blood pressure 
monitoring may be less likely to use a blood-pressure monitoring automation. Response 
confidence, as used in this study, refers to how confident the user is in his or her response 
decision. These factors represent possible avenues of future research that should be 
explored.
Multiple Alarms on Trust and Acceptance Rate
The primary goal of this study was to examine trust and acceptance behavior 
when multiple alarms are present. As expected, participants calibrated their trust and 
acceptance rate of the test alarm based on the overall number of active alarms in the 
system (see Figure 5). These results are similar to those found by Gilson et al. (2001) 
and support a system-wide theory of trust, wherein additional alarms were found to effect 
response time and acceptance rate (Rice, 2009).
Notably, the analysis of acceptance behavior based on the number o f additional 
alarms allows for greater examination of the system-wide trust theory than previously 
reported. The results of this study suggest that what is currently considered system-wide 
trust theory may simply be an extension of probability matching theory (Bliss et al.,
1995).
Probability matching behavior occurs when participants match their acceptance 
rate to the probability of a true alarm. In multiple-alarm situations, it appears participants 
may employ an analogous strategy to determine alarm acceptance. The difference is the 
probability of alarm validity was inferred from the overall number of active alarms rather 
than on the given alarm system reliability. When more than 50% of the system was 
activated, which would indicate greater-than-chance odds, the test alarm was generally
38
accepted. Conversely, when the probably of a true alarm was below 50%, or less than six 
activated alarms, the test alarm was rejected.
Previous research with individual alarms has consistently indicated that reliability 
level affects trust (Lee & See, 2004; Meyer, 2001; Rice, 2009); however, the average 
trust ratings for the 50% and 75% reliability level in this study were not significantly 
different. These findings represent a departure from previous reliability research, and 
further suggest operators may disregard given or learned reliability information in favor 
of using the number of activated alarms in order to determine the probability of a true 
alarm.
Design Implications
The results of this study have notable implications for display design. The growth 
of complexity in system operations has increasingly separated the operator from the raw 
data used by the system, creating opaque systems in a variety of domains (Wiegmann et 
al., 2001). In an opaque system, information concerning raw data, system processing, 
and algorithms are generally unavailable to the operator. Aviation cockpits and operating 
rooms serve as real-world examples of these complex systems requiring multiple 
signaling systems. When raw data or algorithms are absent, operators are forced to 
evaluate a system’s recommendation without understanding the basis for the 
recommendation. The operator must then rely on other factors, such as the probability of 
an alarm being true, when choosing to accept an alarm. Researchers recommend 
increasingly transparent designs, such as displaying the processes and algorithms 
involved in automation, to mitigate the detrimental effect of opaque displays on operator 
performance (Lee and See, 2004; Wiegmann et al., 2001). Yet, implementing such
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displays may well exacerbate already high levels of workload in applied task 
environments.
This transparency may be even more critical for multiple alarm displays. The 
results of the present study suggest the operator relies heavily on the visual display to 
evaluate the probability of an alarm being true when multiple alarms are present. This 
may be a function of the mental workload and attention required when using a given 
reliability level or past experience for probability calibration. With a single alarm, the 
number of alarm presentations and the number of accurate alarms must be continuously 
monitored to calculate the reliability based on experience. Even if the reliability is 
obtained without personal experience, the operator must still monitor the overall number 
of alarms presented in order to sustain an acceptance percentage that approximates the 
probability of a true alarm. This behavior has been observed before in prior alarm 
research (Wiegmann et al., 2001)
The visual display of multiple alarms represents a potentially faster and less 
taxing alternative to calculating the probability of a true alarm, as evidenced by the use of 
concurrent alarm number in trust and acceptance rates for this study. Instead of 
monitoring a display over time, the user can make a quick estimate based only on 
immediately available display information. This increased dependency on the display 
may amplify the disadvantages opaque display design, indicating an increased need for 
transparency in multiple alarm displays.
The number of alarms must also be carefully considered. The attentional and 
temporal demands of a complex environment may limit the operator’s ability to fully 
analyze the system recommendation, even in a transparent display. The results of this
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study suggest trust in an individual alarm signal would be lower in a larger alarm array 
than a smaller array. Similarly, if  alarms in an array are part of an unrelated subsystem 
processes, the operator’s use of these additional alarms to calculate the probability of a 
true alarm may result in inappropriate levels of alarm trust and incorrect response 
selections.
To give a real world example, hospital rooms often contain monitors with 
multiple alarm displays. Consider the scenario where five alarms are co-located on a 
screen with a blood-oxygen alarm. The results of this study suggest that when the 
oxygen monitor signals, the nurse will be more less likely to consider the signal a true 
alarm than if only two related alarms were co-located in the display. The failure to 
consider the alarm a true alarm can potentially result in the nurse failing to take 
appropriate action. This issue is further compounded if the other co-located alarms 
monitor unrelated functions, because the likelihood of multiple alarms signaling is 
generally lower than when related functions are monitored. Thus, a given alarm is more 
likely to be the only alarm signaling, and therefore also more likely to be dismissed as a 
false alarm due to the lack of additional signaling alarms. It is recommended that in 
addition to transparency, the display should be limited to related and necessary alarms to 
alleviate the influence of simultaneous alarms on primary alarm responses.
Future Research
To more fully explore design recommendations, future researchers should 
evaluate the impact of specific design principles on multiple alarm arrays. The proximity 
compatibility principle (Wickens & Carswell, 1995) provides a guideline for display 
location based on perceptual processing. The stimuli used in this study were configured
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based on the proximity compatibility principle: homogeneous features and the co-location 
of displays. Co-located displays reduce information access costs, or the costs associated 
with visual search and shifts in attention across a display. Similarly, homogeneous 
features aid in integrative processing (Wickens & Carswell, 1995). In this study, the use 
of homogeneous rectangles may have aided in percent calculations by allowing the 
participant to estimate percent activation as a function of shaded area, whereas the 
collocation of the alarms may have assisted in the mathematical calculation of system 
percentage through the reduction of visual search and information access cost.
The use of heterogeneous features to separate unrelated alarms may lessen the 
potential influence of simultaneous alarms on primary alarm decisions. This could be 
particularly valuable in complex and space-limited environments, such as airplane 
cockpits, where the likelihood of multiple alarms in close proximity is high. The use of 
visual demarcations to join related alarms may also help to separate any unconnected and 
unrelated alarms, thus reducing the likelihood of unrelated alarm inclusion in the primary 
alarm decision.
Additionally, future research should address alarm reliability levels above 75%. 
The reliability percentages used in this study may not have fully captured the variance of 
operator behavior in an unreliable system. Although there was no self-reported trust 
differences between the 50% and 75% reliability group, there was a difference between 
the 100% reliability group and the lower reliabilities respectively. These differences may 
suggest response behavior changes at an untested level of reliability. Using reliabilities 
between 75% and 100% may reveal the threshold at which reliability level is considered 
over the number of activated alarms present. Smoke detectors represent a real world
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system in which reliability rates fall in this 75%-100% range (Bukowski, Budnick, 
Schemel, 1999).
Limitations
There are several limitations to this research, which should serve as additional 
considerations for future research in this area. First, the system used in this study is a 
false-alarm prone system. Considerable research has shown differing effects on human- 
automation interaction due to false alarm versus miss-prone systems (Parasuraman & 
Riley, 1997). As such, the results of this study should only be applied to similar false- 
alarm prone systems.
Although the trust measure used in this study enabled a multi-dimensional 
evaluation of trust, it has not been validated in the literature. Without validation, it is 
possible that another construct may be responsible for the findings. Also, it should be 
noted that alarm acceptance rates were calculated based on five presentations of each 
alarm configuration. This limits the number of possible acceptance rate values used in 
the data and accordingly reduces variability in responses. It is possible that with a greater 
number of alarm presentations, the increased variability would reveal a linear 
relationship, as opposed to a cubic trend.
As noted previously, the alarm stimuli used in the present study were gray in 
color. This coloration differs from the traditional alarm color (red). Previous research 
suggests that participants respond more quickly and with more force to lightness-matched 
red alarms than gray alarms. Consequently, faster reaction times may be elicited when 
using traditional alarm color. In addition to the use of red alarms, future studies should
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use stimuli specific to a complex environment, such as an operating room or airplane 
cockpit, to increase ecological validity.
Finally, operators interact with signaling systems over long periods of time. This 
study does not address the possible impact of fatigue on strategy use.
Conclusions
The results of this study revealed a unique application of probability matching 
behavior observed with multiple alarm displays. In this experiment, the number of 
activated alarms was used to estimate the probability of an alarm being true, instead of a 
test alarm’s given reliability level. This represents an important theoretical contribution 
through the extension of current probability matching theory (Bliss et al., 1995). 
Furthermore, when taken in conjunction with previous work by Gilson et al. (2001), there 
is evidence this strategy is employed for a variety of array sizes and alarm reliabilities. 
Design implications include the importance of transparent displays and limiting large 
alarm arrays, especially in complex and opaque environments. Specific design solutions, 
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Purpose of this Form: The purposes of this form are to give you information that may affect 
your decision whether to say YES or NO to participation in this research, and to record the 
consent of those who say YES.
Research Project Title: Effects of Simultaneous Alarms on Resolution Heuristics
Responsible Project Investigator(s): J. Christopher Brill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, College of 
Sciences, Psychology Department
Co-Investigator(s): Amanda Allen, Graduate student, College of Sciences, Psychology 
Department
Overview of Research Project: This experiment is intended to examine how you judge a test 
alarm when other alarms are also present. If you choose to participate in this study, you will be 
asked to respond to the presentation of visual alarms on a computer screen.
If I choose to participate, what will I be asked to do?
You will be asked to complete a brief medical history to ensure that you are eligible to participate 
in the study. This medical history primarily asks about conditions or medications that might be 
related to sensory deficits (e.g., loss of hearing, reduced skin sensitivity) and motor ability. You 
may refuse to answer any questions that make you feel uncomfortable.
The researcher will then seat you in front of the computer screen, and you will be provided with 
more specific instructions on how to complete the task. You will have the opportunity to ask for 
clarification if any aspect of the task is confusing.
What steps are being taken to ensure my privacy?
All information you provide will be kept confidential, and none of the forms will list your name. 
This form will be separated from the rest of your data packet so no one can link your data and 
your identity. All written information (e.g., surveys, forms, etc.) is kept in a locked file cabinet.
A numerical code will be used for all electronic information (e.g., performance data) so that your 
identity cannot be linked with the data file.
Are there any risks associated with participating in this experiment?
The experiment does not require you to perform actions beyond those experienced in everyday 
life. Therefore, this protocol is deemed minimal risk.
What if I have questions about the experiment or its procedures?
You may ask questions about the experiment at any time. If you have questions after the 
experiment session has ended, you may contact Dr. Chris Brill atjcbrill@odu.edu or (757) 683- 
4242. The ODU Institutional Review Board (ODU-ERJB) has reviewed my request to conduct this 
project. If you have any concerns about your rights in this study, you may contact the Office of 
Research at (757) 683-3460 or George Maihafer of the ODU-IRB at (757) 683-4520 or email 
gmaihafe@odu.edu.
How long does the experiment last?
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It varies from person to person, but a typical time commitment approximately 30 minutes.
Will I receive any compensation for participating in this experiment?
If you decide to participate in this study, you will receive 1 Psychology Department research 
credit, which may be applied to course requirements or extra credit in certain Psychology courses. 
Equivalent credits may be obtained in other ways. You do not have to participate in this study, or 
any Psychology Department study, in order to obtain this credit.
Are there any benefits or costs associated with participating in this experiment?
While there are no direct benefits for participation in this study, the results will be useful for 
evaluating the nature of alarm resolution. Since this study uses technology largely encountered in 
daily life (desktop computer, and videogame-like systems), there are no additional risks.
Is there anything else I need to know?
You must be 18 years of age or older to participate in this experiment. Additionally, in order to 
be eligible for participation in this study you must not have any major sensorimotor impairment 
that might impact your ability to perceive or respond to visual and tactile signals. You are free to 
withdraw from the experiment at any time without any negative consequences; however, you will 
only be compensated for the amount of time you spent participating in the experiment.
We will be recruiting approximately 50 participants for this study.
I have read the procedure described above. I voluntarily agree to participate in the 





DEMOGRAPHICS AND MEDICAL QUESTIONNAIRE
This survey was designed to obtain information about our research participants prior to serving in 
our studies. We need this information to help us interpret your results. ALL data collected in this 
laboratory is to be kept confidential.
1) Age:______
2) Sex (circle one): Male /Female
3) Handedness: Left/Right
4) Do you have any medical conditions or injuries affecting your vision? Yes / No 
4a) If yes, please explain:
4b) If applicable, did you bring a correction with you? (i.e., glasses or contact 
lenses): Yes/No
5) Do you have any medical conditions or injuries affecting your hearing? Yes/No 
5a) If yes, please explain:
6) Do you have any medical conditions or injuries affecting your sensitivity to 
touch? Yes / No 
6a) If yes, please explain:
7) Do you have any medical conditions or injuries affecting your motor control, 
particularly the use of your hands? Yes / No
7a) If yes, please explain:
8) Do you have any medical conditions affecting your ability to pay attention? 
Yes/No
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8a) If yes, please explain:
9) How often do you play video/computer games? Never Monthly Weekly 
Daily
9a) If you do play video/computer games, circle the number that corresponds to 
how confident you are using video/computer games:




DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EXPERIMENTAL DATA
Descriptive Statistics for Acceptance Rate by Alarm Level fo r the 50% Reliability Group
Number 
o f  Alarms
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard
Deviation
Skewness Kurtosis
1 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.08 2.22 5.98
2 0.00 1.00 0.21 0.10 1.48 1.06
3 0.00 1.00 0.27 0.08 1.45 1.45
4 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.09 0.78 -0.85
5 0.00 1.00 0.37 0.10 0.65 -1.04
6 0.00 1.00 0.55 0.08 -0.08 -0.95
7 0.20 1.00 0.77 0.08 -1.06 0.14
8 0.40 1.00 0.85 0.06 -1.35 0.59
9 0.00 1.00 0.81 0.08 -1.88 2.76
10 0.20 1.00 0.87 0.07 -1.98 3.82
11 0.40 1.00 0.92 0.06 -2.31 4.66














Statistics fo r Acceptance Rate by Alarm Level for the 75% Reliability Group
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Skewness Kurtosis
Deviation
0.00 1.00 0.24 0.08 1.15 -0.06
0.00 1.00 0.35 0.10 0.60 -1.45
0.00 0.80 0.20 0.08 1.10 -0.47
0.00 1.00 0.33 0.09 0.64 -0.35
0.00 1.00 0.53 0.10 -0.28 -1.44
0.40 1.00 0.82 0.08 -0.83 -1.14
0.00 1.00 0.76 0.08 -1.27 0.58
0.40 1.00 0.80 0.06 -0.75 -1.19
0.20 1.00 0.81 0.08 -1.49 0.78
0.20 1.00 0.79 0.07 -1.20 0.37
0.20 1.00 0.86 0.06 -1.74 1.78














Statistics for Acceptance Rate by Alarm Level for the 100% Reliability Group
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Skew Kurtosis
Deviation
0.00 1.00 0.70 0.38 -1.08 -0.41
0.00 1.00 0.73 0.34 -1.01 -0.01
0.00 1.00 0.73 0.37 -1.13 0.08
0.00 1.00 0.77 0.32 -1.54 1.64
0.00 1.00 0.79 0.34 -1.56 1.26
0.20 1.00 0.89 0.22 -2.70 8.26
0.40 1.00 0.87 0.22 -1.70 1.82
0.40 1.00 0.90 0.19 -1.94 3.18
0.20 1.00 0.89 0.24 -2.17 4.25
0.60 1.00 0.91 0.15 -1.53 0.94
0.00 1.00 0.86 0.28 -2.64 7.62

















77me Alarm Level for the 50% Reliability Group
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Skewness Kurtosis
Deviation
1244.80 3828.00 2020.34 669.99 1.55 3.22
1305.80 4003.60 2046.99 800.95 1.29 1.24
1086.00 6013.20 2624.94 1341.53 1.57 2.18
1172.40 31135.80 5930.07 7715.28 3.04 10.18
1129.20 7906.00 3575.67 2206.27 0.94 0.07
1366.20 11115.00 4405.97 2634.15 1.27 2.18
1096.00 8365.00 4264.56 2135.56 0.32 -0.43
1464.40 16690.40 4184.71 4032.71 2.67 7.72
1294.00 14576.60 3659.93 3654.45 2.55 6.46
1239.40 7592.20 2590.19 1562.02 2.83 9.17
1067.80 3732.20 2344.50 849.24 0.26 -1.12

















Time by Alarm Level for the 75% Reliability Group
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Skewness Kurtosis
Deviation
1171.60 11697.60 2929.79 2896.55 2.49 6.17
1293.40 7047.20 2716.04 1469.46 2.10 5.08
1107.00 16289.40 3918.92 4463.91 2.08 3.68
1524.00 12126.40 3501.39 2783.24 2.48 6.65
1400.20 8562.00 3207.29 1970.21 1.75 3.09
1318.00 16508.80 4275.83 4042.12 2.33 5.85
1236.60 10468.60 3543.28 2410.97 1.84 4.19
1358.20 10065.40 3311.97 2839.74 1.76 1.93
1403.60 9538.80 3430.29 2802.50 1.47 0.77
1038.60 8164.20 2641.24 1931.84 1.99 4.16
1078.20 6561.00 2409.61 1436.67 1.89 4.24
1237.80 6677.20 2254.92 1375.60 2.62 8.14
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Descriptive Statistics for Reaction Time by Alarm Level for the 100% Reliability Group
Number o f  
Alarms
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard
Deviation
Skewness Kurtosis
1 1023.80 4631.00 2866.84 1212.41 0.26 -1.14
2 649.00 4813.80 2639.44 1206.26 0.17 -0.52
3 741.20 7878.80 3504.39 2149.44 0.66 0.05
4 682.60 8570.40 3157.97 2205.70 1.54 2.19
5 846.40 6265.80 3269.29 1485.79 0.23 -0.21
6 746.40 8810.40 3090.21 1945.01 2.02 5.79
7 1090.60 12104.40 3853.86 2953.19 1.77 4.00
8 958.20 6972.80 3302.91 2258.30 0.60 -1.57
9 1137.40 6681.80 3193.29 1645.10 0.94 0.14
10 1064.60 14819.00 3858.07 3627.78 2.41 6.57
11 905.60 9923.80 3322.89 2497.44 1.56 2.72














Statistics for Composite Trust by Alarm Level fo r the 50% Reliability Group
Standard
Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
10.00 229.60 134.33 62.24 -0.40 -0.16
12.00 307.00 165.44 70.58 -0.22 0.90
85.50 282.00 171.47 48.72 0.29 0.99
89.25 236.00 178.67 35.66 -0.90 1.75
136.00 231.00 188.80 26.27 -0.55 0.46
144.00 248.70 205.51 27.29 -0.86 1.18
131.00 240.00 213.56 25.61 -2.58 8.35
200.00 285.00 241.59 27.38 -0.14 -1.06
184.00 314.00 240.95 36.78 0.19 -0.55
193.00 451.20 267.53 68.54 1.39 2.43
200.00 375.00 286.68 57.92 0.14 -1.37

















Statistics fo r Composite Trust by Alarm Level fo r the 75% Reliability Group
Standard
Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
14.00 296.00 128.77 92.11 0.33 -1.26
37.80 309.80 176.99 93.11 -0.13 -1.44
53.60 290.00 170.15 66.28 -0.12 -0.70
117.00 276.00 192.56 42.16 0.29 -0.26
162.00 272.00 220.13 33.37 -0.38 -0.84
167.80 280.00 234.62 31.86 -0.69 -0.19
155.40 315.20 244.36 41.62 -0.55 0.37
146.75 430.40 265.52 66.07 0.64 2.03
82.80 327.00 256.32 67.16 -1.37 1.96
116.50 360.00 267.99 64.29 -0.92 0.77
121.00 380.00 285.92 81.67 -0.92 -0.09

















Statistics fo r Composite Trust by Alarm Level for the 100% Reliability Group
Standard
Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation Skew Kurtosis
3.00 400.00 266.24 152.04 -0.79 -1.11
19.75 400.00 280.56 136.96 -1.08 -0.20
60.00 400.00 284.65 121.80 -0.71 -0.81
87.00 400.00 308.22 116.40 -1.02 -0.63
132.00 400.00 295.84 109.90 -0.51 -1.71
144.00 400.00 313.52 96.05 -0.60 -1.36
131.00 400.00 313.42 93.34 -0.81 -0.69
151.40 400.00 329.60 83.51 -0.98 -0.19
184.00 400.00 334.86 76.08 -0.88 -0.21
136.40 400.00 335.79 81.77 -1.53 1.89
203.85 439.00 358.72 70.12 -1.45 1.27
128.20 400.00 348.03 89.92 -2.00 2.97
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